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ABSTRACT
This paper’s objective is to undermine the standard reading on Descartes’s
Meditations, a reading which, abstracting from the skeptical challenge of a
reduction of reason to absurdity which Descartes is responding to,
overstresses the epistemological priority of the Cogito argument, and which,
ignoring the anti-skeptical strategy deployed by Descartes, is blind to the
fact that, instead of trying to garner better support for nuclear propositions,
he attempts to subtract grounds for doubt, working himself into an
enlightened position from which those radical scenarios no longer make
sense. Descartes’s proposal is a modal or metaphysical version of reliabilism
analogous to the contemporary one defended by Ernest Sosa, a position
capable of overcoming skepticism without a vicious circle and which
demonstrates that a correct use of reason yields a theory on how things are
in the world which precludes the unreliability of our cognitive faculties.
Key Words: Descartes, Ernest Sosa, Global Scenarios,
Reliabilism, Skepticism.
RESUMEN
El propósito de este artículo es cuestionar la lectura tradicional de las
Meditaciones metafísicas, una lectura que, abstrayendo del reto escéptico
de una reducción de la razón al absurdo al que se enfrenta Descartes,
magnifica la prioridad epistémica del argumento del Cogito, y que, haciendo
caso omiso de su estrategia anti-escéptica, es incapaz de apreciar que, más
que la recopilación de mejores evidencias a favor de las proposiciones
nucleares, su función es la de sustraer razones para dudar, de tal forma que
el Investigador adquiera una posición ilustrada desde la que los escenarios
escépticos carezcan de sentido. Descartes propone una versión modal o
metafísica de confiabilismo análoga a la defendida en el panorama
contemporáneo por Ernest Sosa, una posición capaz de superar sin
circularidad el escepticismo y que muestra cómo el uso correcto de la razón
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desemboca en una teoría ontológica que elimina la posibilidad de que
nuestras facultades cognitivas no sean fiables.
Palabras clave: Confiabilismo, Descartes, Ernest Sosa,
Escenarios globales, Escepticismo.
1. Introduction
The common narrative on Descartes’ Meditations is nowadays as trite
as were the skeptical arguments provided in the First Meditation (and taken
from the writings of ancient Academics and Pyrrhonists) in the context of
the Seventeen Century philosophical environment.1 When I first came to
think about how to organize the material of this essay and on the best way of
dealing with its subject I deemed this fact as an unquestionable reason for
omitting this tedious and well-known topic and for presenting my reading
proposal without more ado, only counting on the text and on the epistemological
context (the revival of skepticism in late Renaissance2 ) Descartes is
responding to (his background materials) for backing my claim. But, after a
while, a more compelling cluster of arguments led me to an opposite
conclusion. It was not only that from a pedagogical point of view repetition
is always better than obscurity; but that from a philosophical standpoint this
specific exercise in repetition was, at least in two senses, necessary. First,
because contemporary philosophers are so utterly infatuated with particular
problems raised by the Meditations (How to solve, or dissolve, the Dream
Hypothesis? Is the Cogito an inference, an intuition or a performance? Is
Descartes an advocate of the so-called “myth of the ghost in the machine.”3?
What are the relations between Descartes’ philosophy and the foundations
1 “Now the best way of achieving a firm knowledge of reality is first to accustom
ourselves to doubting all things, especially corporeal things. Although I had seen many
ancient writings by the Academics and the Sceptics on this subject, and was reluctant to
reheat and serve this precooked material, I could not avoid devoting a whole Meditation to
it.” (Emphasis added) Descartes, R., Meditations on First Philosophy with Objections and
Replies, in J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes (Volume II), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 94. Descartes, R.,
Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, in C. Adam, P. Tannery (eds.), Oeuvres de Descartes.
Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (VII), J. Vrin, Paris, 1996, p. 130. (Thereafter, and
according to the normative usage in Cartesian scholarship, we’ll cite as follows: AT, volume
and page and CSM, volume and page).
2 Cfr. Schmitt, C. B., “The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times”, in M.
Burnyeat (ed.), The Skeptical Tradition, University of California Press, Berkeley / Los
Angeles, 1983, pp. 225-251.
3 Cfr. Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Penguin Books, London, 1990, pp. 17-25.
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of modern physics and between his epistemological project and radical
democracy?), that they are prone to forget that these topics are not isolated
items, but wheels and clogs in a complex machine whose meaning is
determined by their functions and whose sense depends on the sense of the
whole, and so, because in many cases they don’t see the wood for the trees,
to give an outline of the Meditations as a whole made sense. Second, and
apart from this, the case I wanted to defend gained an additional support
from the failures implicit in the traditional narrative, or, in other words, because
the common model I wish to reject is interlocked with several insurmountable
problems which question (at a very basic level) Descartes’ capacity as
philosopher, to contrast it with an alternative model which, shedding light on
the text, shows that Descartes is innocent of preposterous blunders, it pays
huge dividends: on the one hand, the anxiety resulting from those supposed
blunders helps the reader to overcome his hermeneutical prejudices (the
resistances of the will which prevent us from coming to see something as
something else and which hinder our liberation from a mesmerizing scheme)
and thus, smoothing the transition between ingrained views and arrangements
of familiar things in unfamiliar patterns, it prods the reader to welcome fresh
perspectives; on the other hand, the principle of charity plays the role of
an external criterion, of a neutral court of appeal which, at least, is capable
to put an end to disputable questions by default (but without arbitrariness).
To recap: (i) it’s better to make sense of a text without getting nonsense in
return than to shed light on senseless doctrines; (ii) to draw comparisons
between different systems is equivalent to provide tacit arguments.
I’ll divide this paper in four parts. First, I’ll give an outline of the
traditional reading on Descartes’ Meditations, underlining several problems
(apparently for Descartes, really affecting his critics) raised by this narrative.
In second place, I’ll describe the skeptical challenge Descartes is trying to
cope with, that is to say, the skeptic’s attempt at a reduction of reason to
absurdity, thus providing the necessary background in order to understand
the epistemological conditions Descartes is responding to. Next, I’ll apply
those conditions to the riddle of the Cogito, showing how, because it doesn’t
meet them, its incorrigibility doesn’t entail indubitability, and thereby, how
in the Meditations there is neither such a thing as a “first certainty” nor
such a thing as a quixotic task of attempting to establish the existence of the
external world from the invulnerable but isolated peak of a pure subjectivity.
Finally, I’ll show that the question which Descartes faces concerns reason’s
capacity of validating reason; how, because his strategies are (in a certain
sense) successful without circularity, his argument is not open to crushing
procedural objections; how his procedure is (ironically) akin to the one
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employed by his deflationary critics in order to show that the conundrums he
posed are meaningless (Descartes is not trying to garner new and better support
for nuclear propositions; on the contrary, he attempts to subtract grounds for
doubt, working himself into a position from which these hypotheses no longer
make sense to him); and, last by not least, I’ll attempt to clarify why the
existence of an omnipotent and necessary God as a deliverance of reason
constitutes the keystone of his epistemic building.
I want to be clear from now, stating some disclaimers: (i) I’m not going
to talk about the particular proofs provided by Descartes in order to demonstrate
God’s existence. My topic is quite different: what is the function of God in his
epistemological project, or, in other words, what role plays God from the point
of view of the whole. (ii) In fact, although I think that there is no difficulty in
principle about Descartes’ procedure in the Meditations, I’m not an advocate
of his substantive arguments for the existence of a nondeceiving God, reasons
which I deem deeply defective. In this respect, I think that Descartes made a
great discovery, that he opened the only possible path to coping with radical
skepticism, but stopping short of his goal. It would be fair to state that he
bestowed the compass and the vessel on us, but not a land which still is
waiting to be gained. (iii) At last, I would like to remark that, if only half of the
things I’m about to say are true, Descartes cast longer shadows on philosophy
than the ones we suspected in our wildest dreams. The implications of his
epistemological position, which could be labeled as modal or metaphysical
reliabilism, go well beyond this area, transforming for the better such distant
fields as modal logic, theory of argumentation, philosophy of language or ethics.
2. The Meditations’ epistemological project
according to the standard reading
According to the standard interpretation of the Meditations the Cartesian
project is as clear as unfeasible. It could be divided in three consecutive sections,
although I’ll focus (owing to their relevance for the reconstruction of the text)
in the proceedings to raise a radical skepticism, proceedings which constitute
the first section.
In the First Meditation Descartes introduces a fictional character: the
Meditator, who stands for every human being detached from any particular
upbringing and schooling, innocent of philosophical commitments and in control
of his perceptual and rational faculties, that is to say, with his cognitive powers
intact4 . This rhetorical device performs several tasks: it dissociates Descartes
4 In the incomplete dialogue The Search for Truth by Means of the Natural Light this
character is called Polyander, a Greek name which means “Every Man”. Cfr. AT X, p. 499.
CSM II, p. 402.
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(the man and his personal history) from his rational voice, giving a wider
scope to the research (which, unlike the Discourse on the Method, is not
an intellectual memoir), avoiding the parochialism of time or space and
reducing hypothetical qualms about secret and personal agendas; it helps
the identification between any reader (independent of his circumstances)
and this sketchy “ghost”; it minimizes the risk of dialectical tricks and
legerdemains (so common in philosophical dialogues where the author
concedes external authority to some characters and deploys a technical
jargon overwhelming but unconvincing); it softens the transition between
common sense and metaphysical doubts; it colors the investigation with a
dramatic (or ethical) tone; and, finally, it justifies the procedural decisions of
sidestepping the epistemological scrutiny of each possible individual judgment
and of undertaking the “general demolition” of opinions undermining “the
foundations of (the) building”,5 foundations which, of course, are common
to all human beings independently of their conditions.
The Meditator starts a dangerous voyage which, at the end of the First
Meditation, brings him to the harbor of utter despair: he is compelled by
reason to withhold assent to all his beliefs. This uninspiring and depressing
result comes from a gradual deepening of skeptical scenarios, a progression
into abyss through three discernible stages:
(a) In the first stage the Meditator casts doubts on beliefs concerning
“objects which are very small or in the distance.”6 These are empirical
doubts, namely, doubts which are raised pointing to some uneliminated but
eliminable possibility that can defeat a cognitive claim, which could be
appeased recurring to better evidential support (or to a better cognitive
position), thus presupposing that everyone knows in advance what would
count as a definitive proof for or against a claim and what would be the
correct (or ideal) method for solving the proposed question, which, because
even in the most bizarre of the cases we would know what the skeptic is
demanding from us, are sensible and understandable in ordinary contexts
(they don’t imply madness, at most only a harmless eccentricity), and which
are noninfectious doubts, that is to say, which, because they are incapable
to damaging the foundations of our cognitive building, don’t affect to our
perceptual judgments in unbeatable circumstances or to our senses as a
whole. I could doubt that the thing I’m pointing to is a bird, because I didn’t
check it, ruling out the possibility of an automaton which behaves like a bird
and looks a bird. I don’t know if I’m really the person I think I am because
5 AT VII, p. 18. CSM II, p. 12.
6 Ibídem.
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I never excluded the possibility of a mix-up at the hospital. I could doubt that
the thing I see through the telescope is truly a planet, because the same data
agree with alternative explanations: an artificial structure or a shallow surface.
All these doubts make sense for a while (or under conditions fixed by a
narrative), but after checking the bird, travelling to the planet or visiting the
hospital for several DNA tests they are spurious. Moreover, since what is
unknown is also uncheckable and owing to the fact that the first requirement
which a reasonable doubt has to meet is to offer some conjectural explanation
of how it is that we might erroneously believe the proposition which is being
targeted by the argument we appeal to, it’s of no avail to try to construct an
unmitigated skepticism recurring to the abstract and indefinite possibility
of checkable but unchecked defeators (defeators which we aren’t aware
of).7 In short, these doubts are limited, that is, the procedure deployed for
raising them is incapable of shattering beliefs which “(also) are derived
from the senses –for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a
winter dressing-gown.”8
(b) In the second stage the Meditator entertains a global scenario, the
dream hypothesis, which raises rational doubts over perceptual judgments
in unbeatable circumstances and which overthrows our whole evidential
and perceptual system. This scenario is weak (unlike empirical scenarios, it
is not easy for it to be true), but, because its mere logical possibility is more
than enough for justifying uncertainty and because deployment of evidences
in order to overcome it is forbidden on pain of falling into the traps of circularity,
infinite regress or arbitrary assumption, it is both too close for comfort and
irrefutable. In other words, if this argument provides a reason for doubt the
present experience (appealing to the impossibility for the subject of getting
sure signs for distinguishing perceptions and dreams, that is, signs incapable
of being replicated in dreaming: after all, there are coherent and vivid dreams),
then, because if I may be dreaming now I may be dreaming at any time, it
provides also a reason to doubt whatever experience we appeal to in order
to rule out that possibility (for instance, I could be dreaming of pinching my
ear or walloping my face as means to settle the question whether I’m fast
sleep or awake). This notwithstanding, two remarks are apposite here: (i)
Doubts regarding my body or the existence of the external world (beliefs
7 This is why the neo-pyrrhonian attempt to create a variety of skepticism as wide as the
Cartesian one without recurring to global scenarios is a misfire. Cfr. Fogelin, R. J., Pyrrhonian
Reflections on Knowledge and Justification, Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York,
1994, pp. 192-204.
8 AT VII, p. 18. CSM II, p. 13.
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under the scope of the dream hypothesis) are remote, but imaginable; that
is to say, we know what it would be like for those beliefs to be false (I can
imagine a state of affairs where, keeping all the experiences I have, I’m a
brain in a vat in Alpha Centaury or where I’m suffering all the deceptions
we are familiar to after The Matrix). (ii) According to Descartes, this
procedure has limits: arithmetical truths, logical laws and the very extant of
my inner experiences (sensations, intentions and reflections), and whatever
(in the last examples) could be their origins and their truth-values, are
indubitable in spite of the dream hypothesis, that is, independently of the
existence of a world beyond my mind. In Descartes’ words: “For whether I
am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square
has no more than four sides. It seems impossible that such transparent truths
should incur any suspicion of being false.”9
(c) It seems quite impossible. But is it really impossible? In the last
stage the Meditator finds a way to cast doubts over these psychologically
compulsive beliefs: the possibility of an omnipotent demon whose task is
deceiving him on the most evident matters, making him to believe that the
deliverances of reason are true when in fact (because our minds are, under
this hypothesis, unreliable instruments) they don’t correspond with the world.
Unfortunately, in this cognitive story this scenario plays the role of the “ugly
duckling” and the interpreters are prone to turn aside with relief from what
they consider a mere rhetorical device. After all, either because he endorsed
a psychological and subjective conception of proof (unshakeable
convictions like the Cogito are certain because unshakeable) or because he
employed rational arguments for demonstrating the Cogito and God’s
existence without a qualm, Descartes himself (we are told) gave to this
scenario little serious consideration. Critics only pay attention to this hypothesis
in the proximity of the Cartesian Circle (since this scenario is still in operation
at the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes cannot appeal to intuitions
in order to demonstrate a God whose function is to back intuitions without
begging the question), but even in this case their point is only procedural: the
real drawback for the Cartesian proofs of God it is not that they are arguments,
but that they are bad arguments. Anyway, this explains why epistemologists,
from Moore to Sosa,10 think that the Dream Argument is the “big game”. A
9 AT VII, p. 20. CSM II, p. 14.
10 Cfr. Moore, G. E., “Proof of an External World”, in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Papers,
George Allen & Unwin LTD, London, 1959, pp. 127-150. Cfr. Sosa, E., “Dreams and
Philosophy”, in E. Sosa, A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and reflective Knowledge, Volume
I, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 1-21.
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serious mistake, because this means that they weren’t able to identify the
serious challenge Descartes has committed himself to face.
After this point procedures are easily reconstructed. In the Second
Meditation (corresponding to the second act of the play), the Meditator finds
an Archimedian Point beyond the scope of the skeptical flooding: the Cogito.
The rest of the writing (third act) is devoted to regain (with the only help of
the First Certainty) those beliefs overthrown by the metaphysical doubts
raised in the First Meditation, beliefs which, by the end of the work, are not
only psychologically strong but philosophically warranted. The process looks
like an inverted image of the Method of Doubt: from the foundations of
judgment to the disputable parts of the cognitive building. First, and reflecting
about the origins of his ideas, the Meditator comes to demonstrate the
existence of a benevolent God,11 capable to warrant our “clear and distinct”
ideas and to justify the reliability of our reason (mathematical and formal
truths are regained). In second place, the same resource is employed to
prove the existence of the external world: because a God like Berkeley’s,
who produces coherent sets of ideas, would still be a deceiving (or, at least,
a misleading) God, since those ideas do not correspond to external reality
and we are strongly inclined to assent them, the benevolence of God is
inconsistent with the Dream Hypothesis, and thus, perceptual judgments in
unbeatable circumstances and the general belief in a external reality is
warranted. Obviously, neither the world so-well regained corresponds exactly
with the commonsense world (after all, we know by now that qualities are
subjective and that the physical world is colorless) nor the empirical doubts
are dismissed. But nothing important is missed: (in general) senses seem
justified.
Nonetheless, something is fishy in this account. I recount some specially
disquieting problems: (i) If Descartes thought that the Second Meditation
did put his own existence beyond reasonable doubt, why does he explicitly
mention (in a disconcerting passage at the beginning of the Third Meditation),
among logical and arithmetical propositions which are still doubtable, a
principle which has a direct bearing with the Cogito (“So long as I think that
I am something, I am not nothing”), adding that, at this stage of the argument,
the members of this set (including the Cogito) are doubtful?12 (ii) Whether
11 In fact, God is not a deceiver because His benevolence, but for the sake of His
omnipotence. Only a powerless being has to deceive in order to achieve his goals. This
implies that the Demon Scenario is conceptually contradictory: a deceiver wouldn’t have
enough power to break the veracity of our rational beliefs.
12 AT VII, p. 36. CSM II, p. 25.
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he defended that the Cogito is certain because we cannot come to imagine
what it would be like for it to be false or whether its invulnerability rests on the
reliability of reason’s deliverances, why didn’t Descartes extend certainty to
other compulsions (I cannot imagine what it would be like for two and three
added together to be forty either) or to the principles of logic? (iii) Why didn’t
he mind his most radical (and novel) skeptical scenario? (iv) If the “big game”
is the Dream Hypothesis, how did he make such a sketchy and patched job of
rebuttal in two disconnected paragraphs at the very end of the Six
Meditation?13 Maybe this wasn’t his main concern? (v) How to give account
of the Circle’s blunder, when Descartes was fully aware (from the first page)
of the skeptical charge of reciprocity?14 (vi) Finally, if we subscribed this
narrative, what could we do of the Fifth Meditation, since it seems that the
attempt to accommodate it to the strictures of this model is forlorn? Is it
another blunder? Likely an extra piece of material, swiftly arranged, glued and
botched?
There are too many questions and no answer. Let’s start afresh.
3. The skeptical framework
Ancient skepticism played an essential role in the formation of Modern
Thought. After the editio princeps of Cicero’s philosophical works in 1471
(including On Academic Scepticism,15 our best source concerning several
varieties of skepticism which thrived under the shadow of the School founded
by Plato) and the Latin translation of Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism16
published in 1562, radical skepticism became a powerful weapon in hands of
those who tried to discredit natural reason in behalf of religion, faith and a
complete confidence in Scripture. The writings of Pedro de Valencia, Francisco
Sánchez, Michelle de Montaigne17 and Pierre Charron are enough testimony to
this trend.
13 AT VII, pp. 89-90. CSM II, pp. 61-62.
14 AT VII, p. 2. CSM II, p. 3.
15 Cfr. Cicero, On Academic Scepticism, in C. Brittain (ed.), Cicero. On Academic Scepticism,
Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis / Cambridge, 2006.
16 Cfr. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, in J. Annas, J. Barnes (eds.), Sextus
Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005.
17 “As for our participation in the knowledge of the truth, such as it is, it is not by our
own powers that we have acquired it. God has taught us enough of that through the witnesses
he has chosen among the common people, simple and ignorant, to instruct us in his admirable
secrets: our faith is not our own acquisition, it is a pure gift of another’s liberality. It is not by
reasoning or by our intellect that we have received our religion, it is by external authority and
commandment. The weakness of our judgment assists us rather than its strength, and our
blindness, rather than our clear sight. It is through the mediation of our ignorance rather than
of our knowledge that we are knowers of that divine knowledge.” Montaigne, M., Apology
for Raymond Sebond, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis / Cambridge, 2003, p. 61.
20
M
O
D
ES
TO
 M
. G
Ó
M
EZ
 A
LO
N
SO
It would be preposterous even to try a thumbnail sketch of the motley
collection of positions encompassed by the general concept of “skepticism”
(positions which include therapeutic, hypothetic, externalist and substantive
versions18 ), of the subtle strategies deployed by the skeptics in order to
prove that the conditions established by Stoicism to define “knowledge” [we
know that p if (i) p is true, (ii) it is caused by the fact which is its object in the
relevant way, and (iii) it cannot be false, that is, we have conclusive reasons
which rule out the possibility of believing that p while it is false] cannot be
met, or of the skeptics’ attempts to cope with the charge of being a self-
refuting stance and to clarify how it is possible to live without assent. Owing
to its special relevance to Descartes’ understanding, I’ll focus on a particular
dimension of ancient skepticism: its ethical goals and the rational pressure
it has to face because of them.
In contrast to Stoicism, which, so far as Nature is a rational, provident
and necessary chain of correlated events, justifies our assent to whatever
thing it could happen in our life (according to the Stoa, to wish something
means to wish everything) and tries to reconcile the individual with his
circumstances and to tighten the links between subject and world,19 Skepticism
attempts to cleave both realms, detaching the subject from the part he plays
on the stage of the world. The Skeptic aspires to see his life from the
perspective of the spectator, to play his role without personal or cognitive
commitments, to repose in a “splendid isolation” which, at the price of hope,
gets freedom, tranquility and peace of mind (ataraxia). No more he is
disturbed by the compulsive drive to knowledge. No more he is annoyed
by the endless disputes among philosophical Schools. His sense of irony
keeps him apart, approving (externally) everything without assenting
(internally) to anything. With an exquisite organism too sensitive to pain, and
unlike the Stoic, who overloads every event with a metaphysical meaning,
the skeptic minimizes pain avoiding metaphysical emphasis (including what
we could call “commonsense metaphysics”). Nonetheless, this attitude of
detachment unmistakable for any form of mystical or nihilistic exile, needs
to be warranted, moreover, the skeptic has to cope successfully with the
suspicion of wishful thinking and arbitrariness. In other words, in order to
be ethically comfortable, Skepticism has to be a permanent stance. This is
why the skeptic, trying to secure his position, turns to the (modally strong)
thesis of akatalepsia: it’s not enough to state that just now we don’t know
18 Cfr. Brittain, C., Philo of Larissa. The Last of the Academic Sceptics, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 1-37.
19 Cfr. Bevan, E., Stoics and Sceptics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913, pp. 13-44.
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a thing, it must be demonstrated that we cannot know (and, of course, that
we know that we cannot know).
Unfortunately, this requirement couldn’t be met without abandoning the
unlimited suspension of assent (epoché) which was associated with earlier
versions of this position and which, because it also applied to akatalepsia,
made sense of the self-description of Skepticism as a dialectical and
parasitical attitude (and then, not as a doctrine among others). This problem
was faced by Philo of Larissa, who, weakening the notion of epoché (we
must withhold assent on disputable matters, but not regarding uncertain
propositions) and introducing akatalepsia as a defensible and probable
hypothesis, attempted to avoid the charge of “negative dogmatism” without
relinquishing the ethical commitments of Skepticism. However, and because
it could be extended to warrant reasonable assent to information from the
senses and it entailed a remainder of faith and arbitrariness (after all,
since we don’t have conclusive reasons for akatalepsia, we are not
compelled to assent to it), this conciliatory position was a total failure. The
Skeptic had to bite the bullet: the scope of epoché couldn’t be unlimited.
Beyond its bounds the substantive thesis that knowledge is impossible remains.
Another defeat was waiting for the skeptic, but one of portentous
consequences. In order to demonstrate that nothing can be known, the skeptic
had to rely on the capacity of reason for raising insurmountable scenarios
which, providing conclusive reasons to doubt in any occasion, question (for
ever) that our minds are reliable instruments for the detection of truth.
Nevertheless, these very scenarios also question the reliability of reason
for raising them, and thus, they cast doubts over themselves: instead of
akatalepsia, we receive its mere possibility.20 This conclusion is deadly
for the ethical pretensions of Skepticism, but it is of no avail for dogmatic
philosophers: the possibility of a possibility (its shadow, I would like to say) is
enough for a rational nullification of reason. As a matter of fact, the
situation thus generated is much worse than a secure Skepticism: we can
rest neither in the certainty that nothing is certain nor in substantive certainties.
This is exactly the framework described by Descartes when he wrote:
“It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles
me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the
top.”21
20 One could try to stop an implicit regress to infinity saying that reason proves that it is
true that it is possible akatalepsia, but we must remind that this very truth is only a possible
truth.
21 AT VII, p. 24. CSM II, p. 16.
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4. Reliabilism without circularity
At any rate, we have identified Descartes’ target and the conditions to
solving this conundrum. Descartes will counter the Skeptic by showing that
the most rigorous use of reason does not lead to the conclusion that reason
is unreliable, but leads, rather, to the conclusion that reason is reliable. If
reason is capable of demonstrating God, the scenarios raised by the Skeptic,
irreconcilable with this fact, are not even what they seem to be: logical
possibilities. And nothing in this procedure smells of circularity: like the
Skeptic, who uses (conditionally) reason for defeating reason, Descartes
uses it without presupposing its reliability. A doubt must be grounded for
counting as a doubt (that is, it has to compel our assent). Therefore, there is
nothing wrong in deploying reasons which show that Skepticism is
groundless.
Obviously, in this narrative the Cogito doesn’t play any role: it is not
something which, since it is equal in respect to rational force to the skeptical
scenarios, we could keep in spite of doubt. This, in so far as the probative
force of “God exists” is also equivalent to the assent we provide to the
Demon Hypothesis, sounds funny. But we must remind that there is a deep
asymmetry between the Cogito and God, an asymmetry in their
consequences. While after the Cogito the Skeptic could (coherently) point
to the Demon Scenario for balancing judgments, he couldn’t do the same
after the demonstration of God, since at that stage this option is not a
possibility. In other words, unlike the case of the Cogito, where the Skeptic
can give his assent both to the Cogito argument and to the skeptical possibility,
he cannot assent to the demonstration of God without rejecting his previous
arguments. This is the reason why if the proofs of God are (hypothetically)
valid they are (from an absolute point of view) correct, why if they are
assent-compelling they are automatically valid.
In short, Descartes would hold that even the proposition “I exist” is
fully certain only if the rest of the argument of the Meditations goes through.
We must buy all or nothing, that is, God or nothing.
Finally, I want to summarize the most relevant traits of my reading.
In Descartes’ Meditations there are three kinds of beliefs which
require three different forms of doubt: (i) Doubts regarding empirical
propositions are imaginable, easily produced and removed and seriously
considered by the individual who, doubting that p, actually vacillates between
affirmation and denial, incapable of believing while doubting. (ii) Doubts
regarding a belief which we are strongly inclined to affirm but whose
falsehood is imaginable are different in nature. In such a case, reasons
for doubt are too remote, and thus, because we don’t take them seriously
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enough, it is possible to conciliate our belief that p and the fact that we have
doubts about p: we believe with reservations that p. Anyway, because the
Will is not forced by the understanding to affirm these propositions, they are
not compulsions. This is the place reserved by Descartes for particular
perceptual propositions stated in unbeatable circumstances and for beliefs
concerning the existence of the external world, beliefs which only might be
false under global hypotheses as the dream scenario. (iii) Finally,
intuitions (including the Cogito), that is, simple and evident truths whose
falsehood is inconceivable and which are identified by our common incapacity
to have object-level doubts concerning them, cannot be coherently denied,
questioned or doubted.
Obviously, because Descartes’ objective is to justify our reliance on
rational intuitions; to demonstrate that our rational minds are reliable
instruments for the detection of truth; that reason is capable of self-
validation without appealing (with vicious circularity) to our reliance on
reason’s deliverances; or, in other words, because Descartes’ main question
is: can we rely on our intuitions?; he manages to show that, since such
strong beliefs as the Cogito are members of a class, the general overthrow
and justification of our cognitive capacities and the intuitions yielded by them
makes sense without having to reject what seems obviously true: that we
are unable to imagine a doubt concerning them.
In this respect, Descartes raises meta-level doubts asking if our
compulsions could be false to God or to an angel, that is to say, if they might
be, absolutely speaking, from the perspective of a pure enquirer or from the
point of view from nowhere, false.22 These theoretical doubts are enough to
questioning the epistemic authority of intuitions without compromising
their psychological power. They explain the epistemological importance
of the Evil Demon hypothesis (a mere opinion concerning the possibility of a
omnipotent deceiver capable to producing a poorly designed instrument
for the detection of truth, namely, the human reason); the role played by the
demon’s advocate (a fictional character who, sane, shares our intuitions
without sharing our unwarranted intellectual reliance on them23 ) in the
22 An analogous distinction can be found in On Certainty, the last collection of remarks
written by Wittgenstein. Concerning hinge-propositions, that is, propositions which we
cannot help to believe, he wrote: “What is odd is that in such a case I always feel like saying
(although it is wrong): “I know that—so far as one can know such a thing.” That is incorrect,
but something right is hidden behind it.” Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty, Blackwell Publishing,
Oxford, 2004, § 623.
23 Cfr. Rubin, R., Silencing the Demon’s Advocate. The Strategy of Descartes’ Meditations,
Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2008, pp. 38-44.
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strategy of Descartes’ Meditations; and the reliabilist procedures which
Descartes, unable to add support to his intuitions and forced to try to subtract
grounds for doubting them, has to apply in order to rule out an as remote as
epistemologically relevant scenario.
In fact, anticipating contemporary reliabilism, Descartes replaces the
center of epistemology. There is a way of overcoming skepticism without
a vicious circle. Instead of validating our rational power before using it, we
might take conditionally for granted the results yielded by that faculty,
and if it is capable of validating itself, that is to say, if following reason we
come to demonstrate a theory on how things in fact are in the world
which precludes the unreliability of one’s faculties, then, because reason
is capable of providing its rational validation, skepticism would be
overcome.24 The important thing is to have a world view capable of providing
an explanatory account of how we acquire our beliefs and a metaphysical
or ontological warrant of them (this role is played in Descartes’s philosophy
by the omnipotent God whose veracity guarantees knowledge, but, so far as
this research goes, it might be played by the rational God-Nature which,
according to Spinoza, backs both our reason and our perceptions). In any
case, because the mere opinions which made general skepticism reasonable
before reason’s self-validation would be irrational from this enlightened
perspective, global scenarios would be cognitively defective and irrelevant.
The significance of global scenarios is context-dependent, which means
that, once raised the epistemic bet, their effectiveness cannot be taken for
granted.25
24 Ernest Sosa explicitly recognizes his debt to Cartesian procedures, pointing to a
“Cartesian key to the resolution of fundamental problems of epistemology” (Sosa, E., Reflective
Knowledge. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II, Oxford University Press, Oxford
/ New York, 2009, p. 177), and providing a keen description (which also is a self-description)
of his general strategy. He writes:
“Since Descartes wants not just reliable, truth-conductive cognitio, since he wants the
enlightened attainment of reflective scientia, he needs a defense against skeptical doubts that
target his intellectual faculties, not only his faculties of perception, memory, and introspection,
but even his faculty of intuitive reason, by which he might know that 3 + 2 = 5, that if he
thinks then he exists, and the like. He thinks he can defend against such doubts only by
coherence-inducing theological reasoning yielding an epistemic perspective on himself and
his world, through which he might confidently trust his faculties. And these faculties must
include those employed in arriving, via a priori theological reasoning, at his perspective on
himself and his world, the perspective that enables confidence in the reliability of those very
faculties. (…) Certain stages of the Cartesian project, seemingly incoherent at first blush, are
defensibly coherent in the end.” Sosa, E., Reflective Knowledge. Apt Belief and Reflective
Knowledge, Volume II, ed. cit., p. 141.
25 In his Replies to the Seventh Set of Objections, written by Father Bourdin, Descartes
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6. Conclusion
One last point: if, as I said in the Introduction, Descartes’ attempt of
validating reason ends in a failure, why to make such a fuss of nothing?
For, at least, three reasons: (i) He (like no one else, as far as I’m aware)
was capable to understand what was at stake in the controversy with
Skepticism and to fix the conditions which must be met for coping
successfully with the skeptical challenge. If this is not a real breakthrough
in epistemology, I don’t know what could count as one. (ii) He bestowed on
us a novel conception of proof (where something is proved if it compels
assent whenever considered and it is such that we don´t have valid grounds
for doubting it), a conception which (unlike traditional notions of proof) can
be coherently applied to norms and first principles and which, so far as it
doesn’t implied that what is proved is the conclusion of an argument with
premises, avoids the charges of infinite regress, circularity and hypothesis.
(iii) He stated a novel conception of modal logic, one according to which
neither the logical space is given in advance nor what is possible can be
determined independently of the actual state of affairs (at least, not
independently of the existence or nonexistence of God). By the way, this is
why the ontological proof (which takes the logical space for granted) cannot
be used to rule out the possibility of the Demon26 and it has to wait after the
validation of reason to be deployed.
Obviously, someone could ask why to waste our time in quixotic
epistemological enterprises. My answers are: because we want to make
says: “It should be noted that throughout he (Bourdin) treats doubt and certainty not as
relations of our thought to objects, but as properties of the objects which inhere in them for
all time. This means that if we have once realized that something is doubtful, it can never be
rendered certain. But we should attribute all this to his good nature, and not to malice.” AT
VII, p. 473. CSM II, pp. 318-319.
The preceding quotation illustrates the thesis that, according to Descartes, the validity of
a ground of doubt is contextual, that it varies depending on the epistemic context.
26 The main difference between the proofs provided in the Third Meditation and the
ontological proof is that, unlike the former, the last requires the impossibility of the Demon
as a premise of the argument, something that at this stage cannot be taken for granted. The
ontological proof shows that if God is possible He has to exist, but in order to demonstrate
that He is really possible, and since the possibility of the Demon is irreconcilable with the
possibility of God, it has to prove in advance that the Demon scenario is impossible,
something which, by hypothesis, is forbidden. However, the other proofs share a common
and neutral ground with the skeptic: a conditional use of reason. In other words, like in the
case of the Skeptic who uses reason as a ladder for reaching scenarios which question the
reliability of reason, nothing is wrong in deploying reason for refuting those scenarios in so
far as those arguments work without taking notice of their (still possible) unreliability.
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sense of our life and because, even if we cannot get knowledge and sense,
we gain some valuable gifts: freedom, lucidity, distance and moderation. In a
humorless and rushing world, the moral attitude of a gentleman is as excellent
as rare. I prefer to be awake in doubts than to dream as a monster.
